Roman Politics
A very important facet in understanding Rome’s power and expansion during the first half of the 4th century BC is the development of Roman internal politics during that time. Until the city became enmeshed in an all-out struggle for the mastery of Italy with Samnium in 343 BC, the annalistic tradition is quite often found to be enumerating a litany of internal economic and political crises arising from the struggles between internal Roman factions. Like other city-states, Rome had to find for itself the elusive but necessary equilibrium between the various political orders of the civic body, manifested most notably at Rome by the long-standing struggle between the rich landed patrician families and the plebeian order, whose principal leaders claimed to represent the interests of the less advantaged classes of the population. The struggle of these two orders was, however, only one of a number of dualities inherent in the Roman body politic at that time. There existed an old but evolving distinction between the classis, those who qualified for service in the phalanx, and the infra-classim, those below the grade. Yet another distinction was the patron-client relationship and still yet another was the division between the urban and rural tribes into which the Roman state was physically divided. Either side of many of these divisions in Roman society could contain both patricians and plebeians, which serves notice to the complexity and intense organization of Roman society at this time. Within the context of these divisions, two important crises reached definite milestones in the first half of the 4th century BC, whereby a solution, or at least a way forward, was found allowing the cities’ governing apparatus to stabilize and concentrate attention on the external affairs of the state. The first crises was a showdown in the long struggle between the patrician order and rich, powerful plebeian gens, or clans, for the sharing of the executive power of the state. The second crisis, likely intensified by the effects of the Gallic sack of the city in 390 BC, was the pressing need to provide enough land for the ever-expanding population of the city, and thus maintain Rome's prosperity and it powerful citizen army.
The patrician gens, which for a long time had cornered the market on political power and economic success at Rome, struggled mightily during this period to grapple with the paradox of greed for power and the necessity of compromising for the good of the city. When their prerogatives were challenged, the patricians always responded strongly, even sometimes violently. Most notably, however, they could and did compromise when it became obvious that their obstructions jeopardized the cohesion of the state. The larger but less privileged plebeian order that they faced off against could take drastic measures when its demands went unheeded, such as marching wholesale out of the city and leaving Rome without its army, as happened in 493 BC (Livy 2.32). To the necessities of the situation, some patricians drew a moderate course, but the allowed limits for their generosity were strictly maintained. The patricians, faces with a powerful and coherent adversary in the rich plebeian gens, demanded and required fidelity among themselves. It is interesting to note, for example, that anytime a patrician is found in the annals to be aiming for tyranny, it is always in the context plebeian deprivations, such as famines, pestilences debt crises. Titus Manlius Capitolinus is a prime example for this scenario. A rich patrician nobleman with a history of distinguished service for the city, his final tale begins with a public display of his generosity by relieving the debts of a Roman soldier being led off to nexum, the Roman term for debt-bondage (Livy 6.14). Not long after, Manlius is thrown to his death from the Tarpeian Rock, accused of aiming for kingship. Clearly any attempt by a patrician to find favour with the low classes by such displays of generosity was going to be viewed with the utmost suspicion by his consorts, for good reason perhaps in some of these occurrences. Thus, if reforms were going to be made, they would have to come from the plebeian order, the most powerful and organized representative of the lower orders. This is exactly what happened in the one hundred and fifty years from 500 BC. The main representatives for grievances of the lower classes existed in the office of the plebeian tribunate, a board of officials who positions were held mostly by the members of well-off plebeian gens. These officials were held to be sacrosanct, that is to say they were safe from the violence of patricians or their clients, upon pain of death. The plebeian tribunes, who came to be elected annually in the concilium plebis, a body comprised only of that order, protected the rights of plebeians from arbitrary actions and also were constantly pushing for laws that would further their interests. The most profound accomplishment of this struggle in first half of the 4th century BC was the passing in 367 BC of the Lex Licinio-Sextia: the Licinio-Stextian Laws.
The Lex Licinio-Sextia, a law Livy (6.35-42) says was preceded by eight years of anarchy in the city, was a notable act of compromise, perhaps outright consent, by the patrician order. It comprised the Roman attempt to solve the crises of land, debt and political power-sharing which had gnawed at the sinews of Roman society for so long. According to Livy (6.35.4-5 and 6.42.9) the law contained the following measures: firstly, interest on debts carried by poor citizens was suspended on all outstanding loans, providing the principal was paid off in three years. Secondly, a hard limit on the amount of land a Roman could own was also secured. Thirdly, the Consular tribunate, long in use during the intense campaigning of the 5th century BC, was abolished in favour of the re-establishment of the magisterial office of twin Consuls, vitally with one consulship being made available to a plebeian candidate. While the first two dealt with the issues most dear to the lower classes of Roman society, the final enactment, resisted consistently by various conservative patrician gens, represents an important metamorphosis in the nature of the ruling oligarchy. Rich and powerful plebeian clans, long gaining in wealth and influence but until then held to the fringes of Roman political power, were now to be considered for elections to the executive magistracies of the Roman state. This measure, though much resisted by conservative elements, even after its enactment, eventually was to take root in Roman society. In 362 BC (Livy 7.6), for example, the plebeian Consul L. Genucius Aventinensis was the first of that order to campaign at the head of a Roman army under his own auspices, until that moment a religious ritual of great gravity restricted to the patricians.
The new political order which developed from legislation such as the Lex Licinio-Sextia, the so-called nobilitis, was a marriage between rich and powerful gens of both the patrician and plebeian clans and a recognition of their growing influence. This had the effect of allowing many well-off plebeian families a major say in the policies of the Roman state, a development that matured greatly during the Samnite Wars of the later 400’s BC. The foreign policy preference of the converged orders, following 367 BC, carried on and even perhaps intensified the prevailing aim of leveraging Rome’s growing military power to expand its territory and hegemony throughout Latium. This policy was carried through successfully. Its effects from 367 BC to to the battle of Mons Gaurus in 343 BC were to prove quite beneficial to the Roman state. Indemnities forced on conquered cities were used to help victual the legions on campaign, while various new allied contingents were added to the Roman army, as various cities and tribes came under the cities' power or returned to its hegemony. New Latin colonies, still under the charter of the old foedus Cassinum, such as Setia in 383 BC (Cornell, 1995, pg 303), were laid down and populated with Roman and allied settlers, providing a much needed outlet for Rome's surplus population. Outright viritane land distributions were also organized where the security situation was deemed relatively safe, usually close to a nearby conquered population center. Finally, the need to enslave Romans over debt, used previously to provide a ready workforce for rich landed estates, faded away as slaves from conquered cities constituted a ready and cheap replacement. Many Roman citizens were thus freed up to provide manpower for new Roman colonies and also for service in the legions. The ability of the Romans therefore to overcome their internal social, economic and political problems; their ability to compromise over issues which threw many contemporary cities into chaos and insignificance, very much helps to explain why the city was so successful in the early 4th century BC. Romans held together and solved their problems, thus enhancing the power of the state and allowing it to concentrate on a robust and ultimately successful foreign policy.