The Roman Army
From its earliest times, and no less in the 4th century BC, Rome was engaged in almost yearly military campaigns with neighbouring tribes and states. Every spring, the old Romans were called to the campus Martius, field of Mars outside the city, where the legions were enrolled by the Consuls and sent off to war. These campaigns could range in nature from simple raiding and counter-raiding to major campaigns of maneuver accompanied by pitched battles of serious consequence. The constant state of war in which the Romans were enmeshed was caused by the perilous state of international affairs then existing in Tyrrhenian Italy. A. Echstein (2006) has produced a compelling argument for this chaotic situation, pointing out that Tyrrhenian Italy before the time of Roman domination was, like contemporary Greece, a patchwork of militarized city-states almost completely lacking in the institutions needed for peaceful resolution of issues. For example, the various leagues and alliances that are attested to in the annalistic tradition, such as the Latin and Etruscan Leagues, did not prevent wars of often considerable ferocity between members, let alone outsiders. Another showcase for this point occurred in 445 BC, when Ardea and Aricia clashed over a territorial dispute reports Livy (3.71). Asked to arbitrate in the affair, the Romans, instead of deciding in favour of either party, amazingly concluded the land was theirs, a move which led Ardea to immediately withdraw from the foedus Cassinum. Outside of such leagues, no embassies were maintained in foreign cities and often diplomacy was quickly dispensed with in favour of fetials: religious priests who were sent to recite formal lists of grievances and stiff demands for restitution; a course of action which inevitably produced war. An example of such blighted diplomacy occurred in 426 BC, when a truce between Rome and Veii expired. In this case, instead of an embassy at all, fetials were immediately dispatched to make their formal demands, and so war was renewed (Livy 4.30). Rome lived in a tough, anarchic neighbourhood, and while the city possessed an advantage in strength over any one of its neighbours, it was often caught fighting several of them at once, leading occasionally to grave crises. In 464-463 BC, for example, Livy (3.4-7) explains that Rome came very near to catastrophe, when the city, while suffering the effects of a severe plague, was set upon by the local tribes of Aequi and Volsci. A Roman army sent out from the city was surrounded and almost annihilated, while another army of Latin confederates was destroyed completely. A justitium, a state of emergency, was declared, all business was suspended and every available citizen enrolled and sent out to fight. By dint of hard campaigning the city averted disaster, but the episode is a good indicator as to why Rome, like its neighbours, existed from its earliest times as a deeply militarized state, suspicious and aggressive towards all.
The fight for survival in an anarchic world led over time to the fostering of a military ethos in Roman society. This manifested itself in many ways, such as worship of war-gods such as Mars and the Dioscuri and festivals of martial celebration such as the Poplafugia, which included a ritual routing of Rome’s enemies. Virtues conducive to military success, such as courage and discipline, were respected and promoted among all classes of Romans. The careers of Roman nobles included important postings to various stages of military command, such as that of a tribuni militum, a sub-officer of a legion and a legatus, an experienced general attending on the Consul. Romans of lesser status could hope to move up through the various grades of centurion, if fortune and skill in battle resided with them. Romans who did not serve in the army were shown little respect and were barely recognized by the state. For the Roman elite, attaining success in battle during military commands was a guarantor to higher positions in the Roman magistracies, the executive positions of government, while defeat or failure in command would bring a quick end to such ambitions. The great leaders of the early Roman republic, men such as M. Furius Camillus and T. Manlius Torquatus, were above all else generals of the highest caliber, who through their successful campaigns against foreign foes brought glory to the Roman state and renown for themselves and their gens. The deep roots of a militaristic society and culture at Rome also had its dark side however, where good qualities such as courage and discipline were weighed off against traits such as harshness, arrogance and brutality. Ring-leaders of revolted cities and surrendered foreign magistrates were often brought to Rome, paraded about like animals, opened up to the insults of the mob and then scourged and beheaded on the forum, the cities central place of business. In 386 BC, for example, when a Roman army captured Faliscan Nepete, those found to be anti-Roman were quickly beheaded, while allied Etruscan soldiers were also put to the sword (Livy 6.10). Tales of Roman generals having their officers or even their sons put to death for not following commands were looked upon with favour by many Romans of the old school. Q. Fabius Rullianus, one of Rome’s most distinguished generals, nearly had his career and life ended in 325 BC when, against orders, he marched from camp and defeated an enemy army (Livy 8.30-35). The trauma of blood and death met with on the battlefield had no little affect on the Roman psyche, but it was born of necessity and did serve to harden their character and resolve. Rome became, similar to the Spartans, recognized and admired for its martial capacities. When Clusium was faced with a massive invasion of Gauls in 391 BC (Livy 5.33), it is significant that instead of looking to its fellow Etruscan city-states for succour, it turned instead to Rome, far down the Tiber valley. Similarly, when another horde of Celts entered into Latium in 358 BC (Livy 7.12) the various smaller Latin cities who had broke with Rome thirty years before, were quick to once again renew their alliance with the city on the Tiber, sending their contingents as under the old Cassinian treaty of 493 BC. Its neighbours may have hated Roman arrogance and its aims at hegemony, but its military was nonetheless respected.
How the Romans fought their wars: the armour and weapons with which they accoutered themselves, the laws and command structures by which their armies were organized and set in motion, the tactical formations that they employed in battles, and any other number of aspects of war, were constantly changing and being improved upon throughout the cities history. With each new enemy or terrain, new lessons were learned and if deemed advantageous to victory, were adapted for use. While the evolution of many of these characteristics of the Roman army are now well understood, the timelines for the various important revolutions, especially in the early centuries, are still very much open to debate. The Roman army of the late 5th and 4th century BC no doubt underwent some important changes. One such important development is dated by Livy to 406 BC (Livy, 4.59), when at the beginning of a war with Veii, the stipendium, pay for soldiers, was introduced. Now Roman generals were able to keep soldiers in the field for longer than one campaign season, which allowed for a greatly increased flexibility when fighting ones enemies. The stipendium allowed Rome to prosecute a continuous siege of Veii over a number of years, until finally that city was conquered in 396 BC. Concurrent to the stipendium was the instatement of the tributum, a tax collected when plunder from wars and conquests proved insufficient to cover the expense. Another important innovation occurred in 367 BC, when the practice of electing between three and eight Consular Tribunes each year was by law changed back to the old practice of a college of twin Consuls. The excess Consular positions were at the same time converted into several highly specialized magistracies which were subservient but highly supportive of the Consuls, taking over such functions as logistics and city affairs, thereby leaving the Consuls to concentrate on campaigning. To support the Consuls on the battlefield, six Military Tribunes were established to provide assistance to the Consul's in the field. This innovation shows the Romans gift of organization and likely was quite beneficial to the prosecution of the cities wars.
Tactically, the 4th century was also notable for important innovations, such as the gradual abandonment of the clipeus: the large, round hoplite shield, for the rectangular scutum (Livy 8.8). Livy notes this in turn went hand in hand with a further important change, which saw Rome’s major military unit, the legion (from Latin legio: to call up) change its tactical formation from the Greek phalanx: a single homogenous mass of men equipped with the hoplite panoply, to a much more complex structure of separate companies, set at intervals and forming successive lines, each equipped with its own type of body armour and weapons. Livy gives a detailed explanation of this type of array in his eighth book (8.8). If the first line, the hastati, failed to achieve victory in battle, it could retreat through the intervals of the princeps, who occupied the line behind, who then closed their intervals and took up the contest. If the princeps failed, they could retire through the gaps of the last line, the triarii, who then closed ranks and made the last stand, as it were. "Matters have come to the Triarii" eventually became a Roman proverb for being in difficulty, says Livy (8.8). This formation, much more maneuverable and flexible on the battlefield, is well known in its fully evolved form as the 'manipular' legion. It is a matter of pure speculation who inspired this change and when it occurred. It is quite possible that it was a gradual change. The specialization of the lines of the phalanx, for example, may have occurred before the breakup of the main array into companies of centuries and maniples. Some scholars argue that the old phalanx formation was not dropped until Rome engaged in mountain fighting against the Samnites in the second half of the 4th century BC, which required more flexible and smaller fighting units for success. The best that can be said perhaps is this evolution most likely took place between 406 BC, the beginning of the war with Veii and the end of the Third Samnite War in 290 BC.
Another important evolution in Rome’s army in the first half of the 4th Century BC is the increase in its potential size during that period. From the beginning of the republic down to the Samnite wars, the standard yearly practice was a levy of two legions, one for each Consul, each consisting of roughly 4000-5000 men. The yearly recruitment of these legions was anything but a haphazard process for the Romans. Roughly every five years a census was undertaken to assign each man to his appropriate tribe, class and century. From these designations, pools of potential recruits for the various grades of infantry and cavalry were organized and provided in lists to the allotted commanders for that year, who used them to recruit their legions. In any year during the 400’s BC, two legions would not comprise the full potential levy of the Roman state and in emergencies, of which there were many, more legions could be called up if needed. In 377 BC, for example, three legions were enrolled (Livy 6.32) as threats from the Volsci and Aequi converged on the city. An enrollment of no less than ten legions is recorded for 349 BC, during an incursion of Gauls, which seems fanciful but this may have included allied contingents and one has only to read the accounts of the Samnite wars from 343 BC to 290 BC to realize that Rome’s military resources by the mid-4th century BC were equal to such a necessity. Although exact figures are impossible, clearly the cities population was rising fast in the first half of the 400’s BC, allowing the citizen army to expand in an equally impressive fashion.